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RECENT CASES
CRIMINAL CONTEM.PT-PRLmuiNARY INJUNCrION NOT BROAD
ENOUGH TO INCLUDE FORTY-FIVE FACULTY MEMBERS CHARGED WITH CRIM-
INAL CONTEMPT
On many college campuses, the 1969-70 school year was one marked
with violent demonstrations which frequently resulted in physical con-
frontation between police and students. For the State University of New
York at Buffalo, the period of confrontation began during the last week
in February and extended until the school recessed for spring vacation, a
period of over three weeks. What 'started as a sit-in on the basketball
court during a game soon escalated to the point where police from the
City of Buffalo were billeted in the gymnasium. The University was turned
into a battlefield with broken windows, paint-scarred buildings and riot
police patrolling the campus. In an effort to restore order, pressured ad-
ministrators obtained a preliminary injunction from the Supreme Court
of Erie County which barred thirteen named students and John and
Richard Doe from perpetrating any unlawful activities on campus.' While
the injunction was intended to aid in restoring order, it, coupled with the
presence of riot police patrolling the campus, seemingly served to force stu-
dents further away from a peaceful settlement of their grievances with the
University administration. Feeling that such "shows of force" were serving
only to pull the University apart, the Faculty Senate passed a resolution
calling for the immediate removal of the police from the campus, and a
lifting of the preliminary injunction. Four days later, on Sunday, March
15, 1970, forty-five faculty members entered the office of the University
President and refused to leave until they had presented him personally
1. The preliminary injunction ordered:
[F]or a period of 80 days from the granting and entry of this order or pend-
ing trial of this action whichever occurs first, the defendants and all other
persons receiving notice of this preliminary injunction, whether acting indi-
vidually or in concert, be, and they hereby are restrained and enjoined:
1) From acting within or adjacent to any of the plaintiff's academic or ad-
ministrative buildings, dormitories, recreation rooms or athletic facilities
or in any corridors, stairways, doorways, and entrances thereto, in such
unlawful manner as to disrupt or interfere with the lawful and normal
operations of State University of New York at Buffalo, conducted by
plaintiff in such places or to unlawfully block, hinder, impede or inter-
fere with lawful ingress to, or lawful egress from any of such properties
by plaintiffs' faculty, administrators, students, employees or guests or
otherwise disrupt the lawful educational functions of the said university;
2) From employing unlawful force or violence or the unlawful threat of
force and violence, against persons or property....
Brief for Appellant at 6, State University of New York v. Denton, 35 App. Div. 2d 176,
316 N.Y.S.2d 297 (4th Dep't 1970).
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with their petition.2 They remained in the office for an hour and fifteen
minutes before they were taken into custody and charged with criminal
contempt of court for violating the preliminary injunction. The faculty
members were found guilty of criminal contempt and sentenced to thirty
days in the Erie County Penitentiary.8 The defendants appealed to the Ap-
pellate Division, Fourth Department. Held, a preliminary injunction which
enjoins named students, and John and Richard Doe, cannot be read to
include members of the University faculty, unless it can be shown that they
acted in direct concert with those who were enjoined. State University
of New York v. Denton, 35 App. Div. 2d 176, 316 N.Y.S.2d 297 (4th Dep't
1970) .
Contempt proceedings, like any other type of judicial action, are dis-
tinguished by the civil-criminal dichotomy. When an action is viewed
as a personal affront to the integrity of the court, it is classified as a crimi-
nal contempt; 5 when an action violating a court order results in specific
damage to the party protected by the court, it is termed a civil contempt.0
A criminal contempt is a "'wilful' disobedience,"7 while a civil contempt
is a "mere disobedience by which the right of a party to an action is de-
feated or hindered."8 The two causes of action are not necessarily distinct
and mutually exclusive; a contempt may be both criminal in its disobedi-
ence, and civil in the damage to the plaintiff, and the plaintiff may proceed
2. Their petition read:
Peter Regan [University President] and his administration have defied the
will of the faculty senate expressed Wednesday, March 11, for the immediate
removal of police from campus, thereby making themselves responsible for
Thursday's events. Hence, we members of the faculty will occupy these prem-
ises until 1) the police are removed from campus and 2) the injunction is
lifted. We are in sympathy with the general principles of the strike and will
be formulating new structures of University goverance [sic]-to follow Regan's
resignation-for the consideration of the University community.
Brief for Appellant at 8, State University of New York v. Denton, 35 App. Div. 2d
176, 316 N.Y.S.2d 297 (4th Dep't 1970). Throughout the rest of this paper, it is important
to note that the professors announced themselves "in sympathy with the general
principles of the strike," thereby making themselves something more than casual
observers. But as will become evident later, this bond was not sufficient to make them
parties to the injunction.
3. State University of New York v. Denton, Index No. D39406 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.,
Apr. 24, 1970).
4. Hereinafter referred to as the instant case.
5. N.Y. JuDicRy LAw § 750 (McKinney 1968). See, e.g., People ex rel. Steams v.
Marr, 88 App. Div. 422, 84 N.Y.S. 965 (4th Dep't 1903), modified, 181 N.Y. 463, 471,
74 N.E. 431, 434 (1905).
6. N.Y. JuDIcIARY LAw § 753 (McKinney 1968).
7. People ex rel. Negus v. Dwyer, 27 Hun 548, 63 How. Pr. 115 (2d Dep't), af'd,
90 N. Y. 402, 406 (1882)
q. Id.
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on both theories.9 In In re N.Y.S.L.R.B. v. George B. Wheeler, Inc.,' °
the defendant was charged with violating a court order, which forced the
defendant to bargain collectively with his employees and to reinstate those
employees who were fired because of their activity in organizing the corpo-
ration's labor force. Wheeler was found guilty of both criminal and civil
contempt. The court concluded that he wilfully disobeyed the court order
and fined him $250.11 They also awarded the plaintiffs damages to cover
their lost wages which resulted from Wheeler's failure to rehire them as
per the original court order.'2 The rationale then dictates that if a crimi-
nal contempt can be proven, all that is necessary for a civil contempt to
lie, is the proof of damages.
Historically, in New York, there has been a limit to the scope of a
preliminary injunction: one can have an injunction "against -the defendants
only, not the whole world."' 3 Courts have allowed the use of injunctions,
and its threat of contempt proceedings, against recognizable organizations
such as labor unions to bar illegal strikes,14 but have refused to uphold
contempt proceedings which sought to replace the responsibility for dis-
jointed mob action on a select few.'5 New York courts have always upheld
strict service of process and jurisdictional standards. However, it was not
until very recently, that the individual in a criminal contempt proceeding
was given other due process rights, such as the right to a jury trial, inher-
ent in the normal criminal action.1' Recognizing the restrictions on indi-
9. See, e.g., Eastern Concrete Steel Co. v. Bricklayers' Union, 200 App. Div. 714,
715, 193 N.Y.S. 368, 369 (4th Dep't 1922). "Frequently an order in a criminal contempt
proceeding in a civil action contains the recital appropriate to an order in a civil
contempt proceeding, and orders in civil contempt proceedings often contain recitals only
applicable in criminal contempt proceedings."
10. 177 Misc. 945, 946, 31 N.Y.S.2d 785, 787 (Sup. Ct. 1941).
11. Id. at 954, 31 N.Y.S.2d at 793.
12. Id. at 953, 31 N.Y.S.2d at 793.
13. Rigas v. Livingston, 86 App. Div. 626, 83 N.Y.S. 1116 (1st Dep't 1903), rev'd,
178 N.Y. 20, 24, 70 N.E. 107, 108 (1904).
14. See, e.g., Rankin v. Shanker, 30 App. Div. 2d 956, 294 N.Y.S.2d 680 (Ist
Dep't), aff'd, 23 N.Y.2d 111, 242 N.E.2d 802, 295 N.Y.S.2d 625 (1968). In this case
the Court of Appeals ruled that those public employees charged with criminal con-
tempt for conducting an illegal strike in violation of the Taylor Law (N.Y. Crv. SERV.
LAW art. 14, § 200-12 (McKinney Supp. 1968)) did not have a constitutional right to
a jury trial. The case turned on the special nature of a civil service employee as opposed
to someone employed by the private sector. 23 N.Y.2d at 116, 242 N.E.2d at 805, 295
N.Y.S.2d at 629. See also Note, 33 ALBANY L. Rev. 610 (1969).
15. See Garrigan v. United States, 163 F. 16 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 214 U.S. 514
(1908).
16. Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194 (1968).
In a case decided on the same day, Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968), the
Supreme Court held that the right to a jury trial in a serious criminal case was a
fundamental legal right which the states could not abridge. With this case in mind,
the Court, in Bloom, held that the Constitution guarantees the right to a jury trial in
a criminal contempt proceeding punishable by a twenty-four month prison term. When
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vidual freedom which accompany a guilty verdict in a criminal contempt
proceeding, the Supreme Court in Bloom v. Illinoisfl stated: "convictions
for criminal contempt are indistinguishable from ordinary criminal con-
victions, for their impact on the individual defendant is the same."18 It
necessarily follows then, that a court must afford the same constitutional
safeguards to one charged with criminal contempt as it does to those
charged with an ordinary criminal offense.19
The court in the instant case chose to follow the rather substantial
precedent in the area. Initially dealing with the question of whether the
defendants were parties to the injunction,2 0 the court relied heavily on
Rigas v. Livingston.21 In that decision, the Court of Appeals stated that
unless it could be shown that the "persons mentioned in the injunction"
acted "either as the agents or servants of the defendants or in combination
or collusion with them or in assertion of their rights or claims, '2 2 the term
"all persons having knowledge of this injunctive order"23 would not be
sufficient to bind them to the injunction. Unless the University could
prove that the faculty members acted in direct concert with those students
the rationale of Bloom is taken with its companion case, it seems certain that the
Supreme Court viewed the charge of criminal contempt as a, crime in the ordinary sense.
To trace the developments of the decisions which led to Bloom, see Note, 1967
DuKE L.J. 682. See also Gompers v. United States, 233 U.S. 604 (1914). This early case
held that the statute of limitations shall be allowed as a defense in a criminal contempt
proceeding.
17. 891 U.S. 194 (1968).
18. Id. at 201.
19. Id. at 198. Speaking on this point, Justice White stated: "Our deliberations
have convinced us, however, that serious contempts are so nearly like other serious
crimes that they are subject to the jury trial provisions of the Constitution, now bind.
ing on the States, and that the traditional rule is constitutionally infirm insofar as it
permits other than petty contempts to be tried without honoring a demand for jury
trial."
There is an indication that this area of constitutional development is still expanding.
In the past, a criminal contempt proceeding was handled summarily as long as the act
of contempt was committed within the sight of the judge. The New York Court of
Appeals annunciated this point in In re Douglas v. Adel, 244 App. Div. 818, 280 N.Y.S.
1005 (2d Dep't), rev'd, 269 N.Y. 144, 146-47, 199 N.E. 35, 362-37 (1935), when they said:
[A] criminal contempt in the 'immediate view and presence' of the court may
be punished summarily if the acts constituting such contempt are seen or heard
by the presiding judge so that he can assert of his own knowledge the facts
constituting the contempt in the mandate of commitment. In that case, no
proof need be given.
However, in Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 39 U.S.L.W. 4133 (U.S. Jan. 20, 1971), the
Supreme Court held that when a court waits until the end of the trial to find an
individual guilty of criminal contempt for actions which occurred during the trial,
it must allow him a separate hearing on the charges before a different judge.
.20. 35 App. Div. 2d at 178, 316 N.Y.S.2d at 299-300.
21. 86 App. Div. 626, 83 N.Y.S. 1116 (Ist Dep't 1903), reild, 178 N.Y. 20, 70
N.E. 107 (1904).
22. 178 N.Y. at 24-25, 70 N.E. at 108.
23 Id. at 22, 70 N.E. at 107.
RECENT CASES
made parties to the injunction, they would not be bound by its edict.24
Following this reasoning the court stated: "[K]nowledge of a majority
alone is not sufficient without proof of agency or collusion with the named
defendants to impose liability for a violation."2
Not satisfied with merely dismissing the case, the court went on to
bring those criminal contempts which arise out of a civil action, such as
a civil law suit, or as in the instant case, a civil injunction, within the
Bloom perspective.2 6 These types of contempt actions have always been
termed civil special proceedings in New York because they are an ancilliary
action to the main civil action. 27 The court pierced this distinction to note
the criminal "characteristics" of this action,2 8 namely the thirty-day prison
sentence which faced the professors for their conviction. Because the civil
special proceeding is criminal in nature, the court acknowledged the de-
fendants' right to confront witnesses;29 a right which had been denied
them in the lower court.
While the instant case does not espouse any new legal doctrine, it is
significant in that it rules out the use of a preliminary injunction to help
cool campus tension. Traditionally the injunction has been used as a
prompt, efficient means of returning the status quo to an otherwise dis-
ruptive situation. It has been particularly effective in the labor field, and
because of this success, many officials, academic and otherwise, have cham-
pioned its use as the answer to a volatile campus situation.30 However,
because of the recent annexation of procedural guarantees to the injunc-
tive process, and the lack of organizational unity inherent in the campus,
the injunction may not be adaptable to the college crisis.31 While the effort
to protect constitutional guarantees may have slowed down the privilege
24. See, e.g., In re Lennon, 166 U.S. 548 (1897); U.S. Playing-Card Co. v. Spalding,
92 F. 368 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1899); People ex rel. Stearns v. Marr, 88 App. Div. 422, 84
N.Y.S. 965 (4th Dep't 1903), modified, 181 N.Y. 463, 74 N.E. 431 (1905).
25. 35 App. Div. 2d at 179, 316 N.Y.S.2d at 301.
26. Id. at 181, 316 N.Y.S.2d at 302.
27. In re Douglas v. Adel, 244 App. Div. 818, 280 N.Y.S. 1005 (2d Dep't), rev'd,
269 N.Y. 144, 146, 199 N.E. 35, 36 (1935).
28. 35 App. Div. 2d at 181, 316 N.Y.S.2d at 302.
29. Id.
30. See, e.g., Mitchell, Violence in America and the Right to Dissent, 37 TENN.
L. Rzv. 129, 137 (1969). There, the U.S. Attorney General stated:
Fourth, if all else fails and a major disturbance does occur, university officials
should consider applying immediately to a court for an injunction. . .. The
civil injunction appears to have several advantages. [One of these is that]
[i]t carries the judicial authority of the courts rather than the administrative
authority of the police.
31. It seems especially important, in a situation such as this, when the very frame-
work of society is being tested, that the court avoid the trap which stymied the lower
court in the instant case. By forcing the injunctive process to fit the campus crisis, one
cannot help but wonder howv many students and faculty saw the basic tenet of our
judicial system, due process of law, as just another empty phrase.
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of immediate, effective, contempt action which the injunction previously
enjoyed, the real problem may well lie within the older rule. It may be
virtually impossible to enjoin the diverse groups of students, faculty, staff,
and street people who may have a part in the campus disorder. Without
being able to show a strong bond between those charged with contempt
and those actually mentioned in the injunction itself, it is doubtful
whether a court could allow them to be brought as defendants into a
criminal court action. The university then, may have to handle the cam-
pus riot as they would any other criminal act. They may bring the viola-
tors to trial in criminal courts, or in the alternative, develop an effective
campus judiciary whose final punishment may be suspension or expulsion
from the university community.
ARTHUR F. DOBSON, JR.
CRIMINAL LAW-EXCLUSIONARY RULE HELD NOT APPLICABLE TO
IDENTIFICATION TESTIMONY OF KNOWN WITNESS MADE POSSIBLE BY LEAD
RESULTING FROM ILLEGAL SEARCH IN INVESTIGATION OF UNRELATED CRIME.
In October, 1967, the Los Angeles Police Department in the course of
investigating a series of burglaries obtained a search warrant to enter peti-
tioners' apartment. Among other articles found in the house, a gun was
seized.' The warrant was thereafter held to be legally insufficient 2 and all
items confiscated as a result of the search were deemed inadmissible as
evidence against petitioners.8 The gun's serial number, however, was traced,
and it led the police to a robbery victims' report at the Lennox Sheriff's
station. The robbery was on the "inactive" 4 file and had not been actively
investigated for over two years. The police contacted the robbery victims
and showed them photographs of the petitioners whom they identified.
See Katzenbach, Protest, Politics and the First Amendment, 44 TUL L. Rav. 439,
440, 449, (1970). Speaking on "governmental" reaction to violent demonstrations for
social change, the former United States Attorney General stated:
What is being tested is the capacity of our political institutions to maintain
that essential public confidence which lies at the heart of our democracy, while
at the same time coping with the stresses and strains of a very rapidly changing
society.
And in conclusion, Mr. Katzenbach suggests:
[I]f the objective of government is-as it should be-to maintain confi-
dence in its processes, it may often have to go well beyond what is constitu-
tionally required to prove its point.
1. Lockridge v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. 3d 166, 168, 474 P.2d 683, 684, 89 Cal. Rptr.
731, 732 (1970) [hereinafter cited as instant case].
2. See Lockridge v. Superior Court, 275 Cal. App. 2d 612, 80 Cal. Rptr. 223 (Ct.
App., 2d Dist. 1969).
3. Instant case at 168, 474 P.2d at 684, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 732.
4. A case is "inactive" when all pertinent points have been investigated. Instant
case at 168 n.1, 474 P.2d at 685 n.1, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 733 n.1.
